We examine the effect of first official SEC announcement regarding Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs), which is an alternative mechanism of taking firms public and suggested to enjoy a regulation gap compared to its counterparts. If so, a big adverse effect may be expected at the time of the first regulatory intervention. Our results do not show support for this hypothesis; however, we find that some SPAC characteristics lead to significantly worse returns in a multivariate setting. Interestingly, despite the regulation targeting warrant accounting directly, we find that offering warrants in SPAC units have a positive impact on announcement returns.

This study examines how America Invents Act (AIA), particularly its shift from a "first-to-invent" to a "first-inventor-to-file" priority rule, affects innovation acquisition. Using the Act as a quasi-natural experiment, we find innovative firms became more likely acquisition targets post-AIA. This increased demand is further evidenced by more frequent contested bids, longer deal completions, and higher bid premiums for innovative targets during that time. Acquirers of these targets subsequently reduced their own patenting, indicating a substitution effect between internal and external innovation. The findings reveal a more competitive and less cooperative patenting environment post-AIA, forcing firms to exit the market or acquire innovation through M&As.